What Tesla can show
A large, connected fleet lets Tesla compare collisions and mileage across control types using the same telemetry pipeline. Its report updates on a rolling 12-month basis.
Last reviewed August 14, 2026
Tesla now publishes a detailed collision-frequency report for FSD (Supervised). It is useful evidence—yet it is not an independent, fault-based, injury, or fatality rate.
The honest answer to “Is FSD safer?” is more specific: Tesla’s own telemetry shows one kind of comparison; public regulators and independent research answer different questions.
A large, connected fleet lets Tesla compare collisions and mileage across control types using the same telemetry pipeline. Its report updates on a rolling 12-month basis.
There is not yet a public, independently normalized FSD rate for crashes, injuries, fatalities, fault, road type, weather, software version, and matched driver behavior.
Treat FSD as supervised assistance. A driver must remain engaged and ready to take control; its name is not a safety permission slip.
Read a chart label before comparing a headline number. Tesla’s current report is a collision-frequency report—not a tally of who caused a crash or who was injured.
| Metric | Tesla’s published definition | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Major collision | Collision with an airbag or other non-reversible restraint deployment. | It is a severity proxy, not an injury or fatality count. |
| Minor collision | At least an 8 km/h delta-V event within 150 milliseconds without restraint deployment. | It uses a telemetry threshold; it is not the same thing as every police-reported crash. |
| FSD engaged | FSD was active at any point in the five seconds before the collision event. | That includes some cases where the driver or system disengaged shortly before impact. |
| Fault | Tesla does not assign it in the report. | A lower collision frequency is not proof that the system caused or prevented every event. |
Source: Tesla’s FSD (Supervised) Vehicle Safety Report methodology.
Tesla records mileage and collision telemetry from the same fleet, then separates FSD (Supervised), manual driving with active safety features, and manual driving without them. That is more internally consistent than comparing disconnected manufacturers’ raw crash totals.
FSD use can vary by driver, route, weather, time of day, traffic, vehicle, software version, and the moments when people choose to activate it. A within-fleet comparison reduces some measurement differences; it does not turn an observational comparison into a randomized trial.
Tesla says its telemetry report does not measure injury data and does not determine fault. It therefore cannot, by itself, answer a question about injury risk, fatalities, vulnerable road users, or legal responsibility.
NHTSA’s Standing General Order is valuable for surfacing incidents and potential defects. It is not a manufacturer leaderboard.
NHTSA explicitly says its public incident reports are not normalized for vehicles in service, miles traveled, operational design domain, or exposure.
A highly connected fleet may learn about more crashes than a manufacturer relying mainly on consumer reports. Multiple reports can also describe the same incident.
The data can identify scenarios worth investigation. It should be read as a safety signal and case record, not divided into a simple “crashes per company” ranking.
Independent research does not yet supply a Tesla FSD-specific, matched crash-rate answer. It does show why driver monitoring, safeguards, and careful study design matter.
A 2024 IIHS analysis of Nissan and BMW systems found no convincing evidence that partial driving automation is preventing crashes in the real world. It is not a Tesla FSD test, but it is a useful warning against treating a convenience feature as a proved safety system without exposure and system-use data.
IIHS separately evaluates how partial-automation systems keep drivers engaged through monitoring, attention reminders, emergency procedures, and other safeguards. Tesla Autopilot and FSD (Beta), both tested as software version 2023.7.10 in a 2021–23 Model 3, received poor overall safeguard ratings. These are dated, version-specific ratings of misuse protections—not a crash rate or a measure of how well current FSD performs the driving task.
NHTSA opened PE24-031 after four reports of FSD-engaged crashes in reduced visibility, including one fatal pedestrian crash. The public record lists the preliminary evaluation as closed on March 18, 2026. That one-page closing record does not turn the four cases into a fleet-wide crash rate or establish a general safety conclusion.
Sources: IIHS partial-automation crash-rate study; IIHS partial-automation safeguard ratings; NHTSA PE24-031 closing record; NHTSA opening summary.
FSD statistics and vehicle crashworthiness are different questions. Review both before drawing a conclusion about a particular Tesla model.
Tesla crash tests and death rates Our methodologyOur rankings, tables, and charts may be quoted or republished with a link back to this page. Underlying crash-test and death-rate data belong to IIHS, HLDI, and NHTSA; see how we rank.